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~‘JTO A monetarist economist, nothing could be more
obvious than the desirability of establishing the money
supply as the target variable for central bank policy.
To any economist, nothing could be more obvious than
the distaste of most central bankers for this course of
action.
the current year have, indeed, dealt a
to monetarists’ hopes that they have
headway in moving public policy in
In the United States, the Federal Reserve system
appears to have abandoned the pursuit of aggrega-
tive targets, or at least to have pushed them far into
the background. When interest rates began to rise in
February of this year because of the economic re-
covery that had begun in December and to soar
during the international monetary crisis in May, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was hesi-
tant about letting them rise too quickly. The FOMC
Record of Policy Actions, together with certain ex-
planations of how open-market operations are con-
ducted that were published in the Monthly Review
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the
Federal Reserve Bulletin,1 signaled the early stages
‘Paul Meek and Rudolf Thunberg, “Moaetary Aggregates and
Federal Reserve Open-Market Operations, Monthly Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York , Vol. 53, No. 4, April
1971, pp. 80-89.
“Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 57, No. 2 February
1971, pp. 105-119. -
of the change in policy emphasis explicitly. The be-
havior of the U.S. money supply this year, a growth
rate of almost 12 per cent through the end of May, has
signaled it statistically.’
In the world at large, the setback to the new way
of thinking about monetary policy, or, rather, the
reversion to more traditional modes, was less explicit,
but nevertheless visible in the events and statements
surrounding the monetary crisis of May 3-5. Truth
surfaces in periods of strong emotion. The language
used to describe the act of love — or the fact of
death — is a language that goes to the heart of the
matter. (In economic affairs, international currency
crises are the emotional equivalent of love or death.)
It is, therefore, depressing that virtually every cliche
was dragged out in the wake of that crisis to espouse
atavistic doctrines (international coordination of in-
terest-rate levels) and to denounce sensible solutions
(the floating of the Cei-man mark). The effect was to
set back the cause of providing a rational basis for
international monetary harmonization,
But monetarist setbacks in the policy disputes of
1971 may nevertheless be laying the groundwork of
future gains in the wider areas of analytical debate.
The ultimate test of a set of scientific ideas is their
2
The Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, which
had recommended in 1968 that the Federal Reserve keep the
rate of growth of the money supply (narrowly defined, M1)
within a range of 2 per cent to 6 per cent annual rate, neg-
lected to renew the recommendation in 1971. Thus was the
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power to predict. It is the unpleasant duty of mone-
tarist economists to predict the consequences of the
12 per cent growth rate in the U.S. money supply if
it is allowed to persist much longer: a rekindling of
inflation and the threat of new international monetary
crises. It is the confident, though depressing, expecta-
tion of monetary economists that these predictions
will prove out because all the discriminating evidence
that can be gleaned from economic history supports
the validity of the monetarist hypothesis, at least at
this level of generality.
Given this set of attitudes, any monetarist discus-
sion of central bank behavior is in obvious danger
of degenerating into an exercise in pathology. But
the authors of this paper intend to resist this course
of action as best they can. Instead, they will address
themselves to four questions: (1) Can central banks
control the money supply? (2) Why don’t central
banks control the money supply? (3) Should central
banks control the money supply? (4) Ought the
world money supply be controlled?
Can c-entral h-a.nks control the money supply?
The authors of this paper have nothing new in
the way of systematic empirical evidence to offer on
the question of central bank control of the money
supply. They nevertheless believe that a review of
the building blocks that led to the establishment of
the monetarist theory of the money supply process
would be useful, although, of course, familiar to all
the participants in this seminar.
The United States is the logical place to com-
mence this exercise. More work has been done on
the money supply process there than in other coun-
tries. It is also apparent that the role of the dollar
as a reserve currency, together with the existence of
a vast pool of international liquidity denominated in
dollars, poses special problems for central banks out-
side the United States. The U.S. case is therefore, in
effect, the closed-economy case. We will take up the
implications of U.S. money-supply changes in an open
world economy later.
A convenient framework for spelling out this proc-
ess is the one used by Allan Meltzer in his 1959
study of the French money supply and by Milton
Friedman, Anna Schwartz, and Philip Cagan in their
historical studies of the U.S. money supply.8
8
Allan H. Meltzer, “The Behavior of the French Money Sup-
ply: 1938-1954,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXVII,
June 1959, pp. 275-96. The approach used by Meltzer
was developed jointly with Karl Brunner. See Albert E.
Burger, “An Analysis and Development of the Brunner-
At center stage is “high-powered money” — some-
times called “monetary base” — which consists of bank
reserves plus currency held by the public. In the
United States, bank reserves are deposits of commer-
cial banks at Federal Reserve Banks (the monetary
liabilities of the reserve banks) and currency held by
the banks. Defining, issuing, and regulating the quan-
tity of high-powered money are governmental func-
tions shared with, or delegated to, the central bank.
The ratio of the narrowly defined money supply
(demand deposits and currency) to high-powered
money in the United States is about 2.55 to 1. If we
use the broad definition of money preferred by Milton
Friedman and others — currency, demand deposits,
and time deposits in the commercial bariks — the ratio
is about 5 to 1.
If the money multiplier were always the same,
changes in the money stock would be determined
entirely by changes in the quantity of high-powered
money. A 5 per cent increase in high-powered money
would produce a 5 per cent increase in the money
supply. But this multiplier is not constant; the banks
and the public can change it and therefore can
change money supply to some degree, even if the
quantity of high-powered money is fixed.
How the banks and the public use the available
supply of high-powered money, therefore, determines
the size of the money multiplier — the ratio of total
money supply to high-powered money. Two ratios
are crucial here in determining what the money mu!-
tiplier is: the ratio of currency to total money that
is maintained by the public and the ratio of reserves
to deposits that is maintained by the banks.
Changes in three variables — the volume of high-
powered money, the currency-money ratio, and the
reserve-deposit ratio — therefore, can account for all
changes in the money supply. Money supply will be
increased by an increase in high-powered money, by
a reduction in the ratio of currency held by the pub-
lic to total money supply, or by a reduction in the
ratio of bank reserves to deposits, if the other two
determinants remain fixed.
This is the accounting statement — the C+I+GY
or the MV=PT — of the monetarist view of the
money supply process. The interesting questions are
Meltzer Nonlinear Money Supply Hypothesis,” Working Paper
No. 7, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May 15, 1969.
Also see Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Mone-
tary History of the United States: 1867-1960, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963), see especially Appendix
B, pp. 776-808; Phillip Cagan, Determinants and Effects
of Changes in the Stock of Money: 1875-1960, (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1965, Distributed
by Columbia University Press.)
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empirical: why does the supply of high-powered
money change, and are the two ratios sufficiently
stable (predictable) so that the Federal Reserve can,
in fact, control the money supply?
Phillip Cagan gave the long-term answer to the
first question. Over the long period 1875-1955, he
found that increases in high-powered money came
from two sources — growth of the gold stock and,
after the Federal Reserve system was established,
growth in credit extended by the Reserve Banks.
The counterparts of these in other countries would
be growth of foreign exchange reserves (including
gold) and growth in domestic assets of the central
banks.
The Cagan data make it obvious that changes in
high-powered money dominate the long-term move-
inents of money supply. Data developed by Brunner
and Meltzer established the far more controversial
proposition that changes in high-powered money also
dominate short-term movements in the money stock.4
They found, for example, that 85 per cent of the
variation in the monthly changes in the narrowly
defined money supply is accounted for by changes in
the monetary base and in Treasury deposits at com-
mercial banks in the current and previous months.
Treasury deposits may be a troublesome source of
static, but systems to cope with this kind of noise can
be designed, and changes in the monetary base are
by far the most important determinant of the money
supply.
With this relationship estimated over the 200
months ending in March 1965, Karl Brunner and
Allan Meltzer were able to predict monthly changes
in the nonseasonally adjusted money stock for the
months of July 1966 through September 1969 with
impressive results. These kinds of exercises relating
changes in high-powered money to changes in the
total money stock are persuasive evidence that the
two critical ratios do not behave in a totally erratic
manner. The behavior -of these ratios nevertheless
merits some attention.
The public’s ratio of currency to demand deposits
is quite volatile. It has a pronounced cyclical pattern,
rising on the eve of recessions and falling during
recessions. The currency ratio, however, can be ob-
served and predicted well enough that changes in it
can be prevented from changing the total money
supply. The Federal Reserve has good information
4Cagan, Determinants and Effects of Changes its the Stock of
Money, pp. 18-21. The Brunner-Meltzer results are reported
in Allan H. Meltzer, “Controlling Money,” Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May 1969, pp. 16-24.
on the flows of currency into and out of the hands
of the public and so can promptly offset any change
in the currency ratio that threatens to produce un-
desired changes in the money supply.
The reserve-deposit ratio determines the total vol-
ume of bank deposits. Much of the literature on the
difficulty of controlling the money supply assumes
that this ratio is highly variable and unpredictable.
There are two main sources of change in the reserve-
deposit ratios in the United States (other than changes
in the reserve requirements set by the Federal Re-
serve Board). The first is the fact that reserverequire-
ments differ among classes of banks and types of
deposits. The second is variation in banks’ demand
for cash or excess reserves.
A good deal can be said about the first source of
change; but most of it, while interesting, would
unduly lengthen this paper. In his pioneering study,
The Supply and Control of Money in the Udited
States, Lauchlin Currie pointed out in the early
Thirties that shifts within the U.S. system would
cause difficulties for money supply management, if
the system ever became interested in trying it.° In
principle, he was correct. In practice, however, shifts
in the average reserve-requirement ratio are surpris-
ingly small (except, of course, the occasional changes
in the whole structure that the Board of Governors
may make for policy reasons). George Benston found
in a recent study, for example, that changes in the
distribution of demand deposits among classes of
member banks and between successive reserve settle-
ment periods are small and predictable.6 Long-term
qualitative changes, however, have been produced
by a steady drift of demand deposits from city banks,
where reserve requirements are high, to country banks,
where reserve requirements are low.
Shifts of deposits between member banks and non-
member banks are a minor source of uncertainty in
predicting total demand deposits, largely because the
Federal Reserve has information on nonmember de-
posits only at the June and December call dates.
Between these dates the Fed must estimate them.
As Benston and Clark Warburton have pointed out,
however, the nonmember banks do not escape Fed-
eral Reserve limits on their power to expand because
they are required by state banking laws to keep
-5Lauchlin Currie, The Supply and Control of Money in the
United States (2nd ed., rev. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1935), pp. 69-82.
6ceorge J. Benston, “An Analysis and Evaluation of Alterna-
five Reserve Requirement Plans,” Journal of Finance, Ameri-
can Finance Association, Vol. XXIV, No. 5, December 1969,
pp. 849-70.
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reserves with larger banks, which usually are member
banks.
In the short run, banks have little or no influence
on average reserve-requirement ratios. Over a longer
time period, however, they can influence the ratios
by inducing the public to hold more time deposits
in relation to demand deposits, as U.S. banks did
during most of the Sixties, for instance. But such
changes are so gradual that they should not cause
difficulties for money-supply management. Regulation
Q ceilings on time-deposit rates also change the re-
serve ratio, as in periods of “disintermediation” or
“reintermediation.”
In addition to the reserves they are required to
hold, U.S. banks hold some cash “excess reserves” in
the form of currency in their own vaults and deposits
at Federal Reserve Banks. In countries where there
are no reserve requirements, banks also hold some
cash. It is through this paper-thin margin of bank
cash that central banks wield their greatest influence
on bank decisions to buy or sell earning assets, and
thus to expand or contract deposits. For the central
banks are the ultimate source of bank cash, which
they create or extinguish. “It is clear, or at least we
must hope so,” said W. F. Crick long ago, “that the
banks, so long as they maintain steady ratios of cash
to deposits, are merely passive agents of Bank of
England policy, as far as the volume of money in
the form of credit is concerned,”7
Volumes have been written in attempts to refute
that simple statement, most of them relying on the
theoretical possibility that cash ratios are not steady.
Yet, for the United States, the stability of the banks’
reserve ratios is remarkable. Jerry Jordan of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis has found that the
ratio of total reserves (required reserves plus excess
reserves) to total commercial bank deposits is the
least volatile of all the ratios that determine the
overall money multiplier.8
Yet this proposition continues to be met with
great skepticism by those who cling to the man-in-the-
street view that business conditions — the volume
of credit demands — determine the money supply.
Richard Davis of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York says, “. .-the possibility of important influences
7W. F. Crick, “The Genesis of Bank Deposits,” reprinted from
Eeonomica, 1927, in Readings in Monetary Theory; Friedrich
A. Lutz and Lloyd W. Mints, (New York: Blalciston Co.,
1951), p. 51.
8
Jerry L. Jordan, “Elements of Money Stock Determination,”
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. -Louis, October 1969,
pp. 10-19.
running from business to money seems to weaken
substantially the evidential value of the work done by
Friedman and his collaborators in trying to establish
a dominant causal role for money.”°Generally, it is
argued that increasing interest rates stimulated by
an increase in business activity will induce banks
to reduce their ratio of reserves to deposits and money
supply. Davis, however, was unable to find much
evidence that this actually happens. Nor has anyone
else found such evidence,
Why is the ratio of bank cash to bank deposits
stable? One answer is the quantity theory — the theory
of the demand for money — in microcosm. Banks be-
have like the general public in that they want to hold
some cash for emergencies. But bank managers keep
their eyes on the risks and chances for profits that
face them. They are not going to hold much more,
or much less, cash than they think they need. Al-
though an individual bank may be willing for a few
days to tolerate a cash position that is lower or
higher than its accustomed level in relation to total
deposits, the bank will expand or contract its earning
assets, and hence its deposits, if the discrepancy
persists. Some U.S. banks are content to remain in a
cash-deficit position, that is, to be borrowing daily
from other banks or the Eurodollar market. But
somewhere in the banking system there must be
some cash to be passed around from bank to bank.
In the United States, that free cash amounts to only
about $200 million, compared with around $450 bil-
lion of total commercial bank deposits.
It is difficult to resist some comment on discussions
of the relations between money and business that
have taken place in the United States over the past
nine months or so. In the final quarter of last year,
when the money supply grew relatively slowly, those
who were skeptical of the causal role of high-powered
money in the money supply process dragged out the
old “you can lead a horse to water but you can’t
make him drink” arguments as explanation. They
implied that the Federal Reserve could not increase
the money supply more rapidly with business activity
depressed. Those same economists continued to talk
of a sluggish economy in the first six months of this
year, yet the money supply grew at a 12 per cent
annual rate. It would be well for those who believe
that a large share of causality runs from business to
money to remember that you can’t have your horse
and eat him too.
°Richard A. Davis, “How Much Does Money Matter? A Look
at Some Recent Evidence,” Monthly Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Vol. 51, No. 6, June 1969, p. 124.
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We come now to the question of money-supply
control outside the United States. It is obviously more
difficult for other central banks to control their money
supplies than it is for the Federal Reserve System.
For one thing, the flows of currency across their
exchanges tend to be large relative to their domestic
money supplies. For another, the instrument of mone-
tary control that has the swiftest effect on the mone-
tary base — open-market operations — is of limited
usefulness to central banks in countries with thin
markets for short-term credit instruments. We will
take up these points briefly, if only to serve as a
focus for some of the issues under discussion at this
seminar.
In many countries, surpluses or deficits in interna-
tional payments balances are said to force expansion
or contraction of domestic money supplies despite
what the central banks may try to do. This, it is
argued, makes countries vulnerable to “imported infla-
tion” — especially inflation imported from the United
States.
That there has been plenty of imported inflation
since the 1958 move towards convertibility is not a
proposition that the authors of this paper are inclined
to dispute. As a matter of fact, we agree that exces-
sive monetary expansion in the United States from
1964 through 1968 contributed substantially to growth
of the world money supply in those years and subse-
quently as well. But we nevertheless raisethe question
of whether the degree of imported inflation that
countries have tolerated was entirely out of their
control.
From a monetarist point of view, the question at
issue is whether inflows of foreign exchange must
inevitably show up in the monetary base of the
affected countries in a 1:1 ratio — or at all for that
matter. In pursuit of this point, Ira 0. Scott and
\-Vilson Schmidt in a 1964 paper pointed out that the
central banks of Europe had indeed been adding to
the stock of high-powered money by buying foreign
assets.’°But they also noted that central banics had
been buying domestic assets in the course of their
lending to their governments and others through their
discount windows. Not all of the inflation was im-
ported; some was homegrown. To prevent it, said
Schmidt and Scott, the central banks should have
offset their purchases of foreign exchange with sales
of other assets. Paolo Bath, of the Banca d’Italia,
10
1ra 0. Scott, Jr., and Wilson E. Schmidt, “Imported Inflation
and Monetary Policy, Quarterly Review, Banco Nazionale
del Lavoro, December 1964, pp. 390-403.
found that between 1959 and 1967 central banks of
the larger European countries actually added to the
expansionary effect of increases in foreign exchange
reserves by augmenting their credit to domestic bor-
rowers.11
This kind of analysis immediately raises the ques-
tion of the relative orders of magnitude of domestic
vs. foreign influences on the monetary base of
countries around the world. In pursuit of an answer,
much scholarly work has already been done — some
of the most notable by members of the Monetary
Project at this University. And the answers have
generally pointed in this direction: casual empiricism
has generally tended to overstate foreign influences
on the size of the monetary base and to understate
domestic influences. The implication, of course, is
that many counfries, in fact, had more room for
maneuvering in pursuing stable monetary growth
than they chose to see.
No attempt will be made to analyze the efficiency
of instruments other than open-market operations in
controlling the money supply, except to note again
that much of the skepticism over their effectiveness
results from examples drawn more from their misuse
than from their inherent limitations. Central bank
lore and practice, for example, mitigate against fre-
quent and ~small changes in discount rates. Yet, if
monetary control were the overriding goals of policy
— and if this were made perfectly clear to market
participants — frequent and small changes in discount
rates might prove to be a fairly efficient method of
monetary control.
In any event, a central bank bent on pursuit of a
money supply target has methods available to it to
beef up its capacity for directly influencing high-pow-
ered money. In his study, Central Banking in Latin
America, Frank Tamagna of the American Univer-
sity in Washington, D. C., reported, for example, that
the Banco Central de Ia Republica Argentina issued
securities of its own that it could sell when it wanted
to influence the monetary base.12 It sold certificates
of participation in a portfolio of government bonds
that otherwise would not have been marketable.
1’Paolo Baffi, “Westem European Inflation and the Reserve
Currencies,” Quarterly Review, Banco Nazionale del Lavoro,
March 1968, pp. 3-22. Also see Manfred Whims, “Con-
trolling Money in an Open Economy: The German Case,”




Frank Tamagna, Central Banking in Latin America, (Mexico:
Cenfro de Estudios Monetarios Latino-americanos, 1965),
pp. 129-33.
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Empirical studies of relations between the monetary
base and the total money supply establish a strong
basis for believing that central banks can control the
money supply. There are, therefore, two possible
reasons why they do not. The first is that the results
produced by statistical and logical analysis of past
data establish a post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc proposition
that, when a central bank actually tries to control
the money supply, those relationships which theory
and empirical analysis suggest are stable turn out to
be operationally unstable. This, of course, means that
a central bank that sets out to control the money
supply would find that it cannot. The second reason
why central banks do not control the money supply
is simply because they don’t want to.
Evidence on what occurs when a central bank
actually sets out to control the money supply is ex-
tremely scarce. This fact alone vests the months since
the beginning of 1970—when the Federal Reserve
made moderate growth of the monetary aggregates
an explicit goal for Federal Reserve policy — with an
extraordinary interest for monetarist economists.
It should be said at once that the rapid growth in
the U.S. money stock in 1971, and particularly in the
second quarter of 1971, raises serious question among
monetarist economists about how seriously the Fed-
eral Reserve actually took the transition to the aggre-
gative goals it announced in early 1970. Nevertheless,
the behavior of the aggregates in this period merits
some analysis.
The behavior of the U.S. money stock from the
point when the aggregative goal was adopted to the
end of the first quarter of 1971 looks quite good to
the monetarist economist, It is true that the 5-6 per
cent monetary targets, that the Federal Reserve said
it was pursuing, appeared too high to be consistent
with true price stability. But this behavior could
be excused as being a transition set towards a more
appropriate growth range of 2-3 per cent for money
supply.
Yet, even within this overall framework of high
grades, there were specific points at which the Fed-
eral Reserve could be faulted — where operating tech-
niques led the money managers astray. They will be
discussed in ascending order of importance.
The first is the lagged reserve requirement for the
member banks introduced in 1968. This rule stipulates
that the amount of daily-average required reserves
the banks maintain in each statement week is based
not on that week’s deposits but on the deposits of
two weeks earlier. As a result of this rule, the
Federal Reserve reacts to influence the stock of high-
powered money after the banks have expanded or
contracted deposits, rather than taking the i~iitiative
in supplying the extra stock of high-powereà money
to which the banks must adjust.
The destabilizing impact of the lagged reserve
requirement was revealed by a series of sharp in-
creases of demand deposits in certain weeks ‘of 1970
and 1971 that showed up like blips on a radarscope.
One of the worst of these was the week ending
April 1, 1970, when the demand deposit component
of the money supply increased by $7.5 billion before
seasonal adjustment and $6.4 billion seasonally ad-
justed, which was more than the expected growth
for the whole year at the moderate growth rate the
system was pursuing at that time. Revision of the
data later scaled the unadjusted increase to $4.0 bil-
lion and the seasonally adjusted increase to $1.6 bil-
lion, but by any measure this was an extraordinary
increase for one week.
The initial cause of the April 1, 1970, increase of
deposits was a postal strike which interrupted the
normal flow of checks. With fewer checks being
presented for payment, the banks saw an increase
in deposits on their books. Two weeks later, when
the banks had to meet the higher reserve require-
ments based on deposits of the April 1 week, the
Federal Reserve supplied the necessary reserves
through open-market operations. However, the re-
serves were supplied somewhat grudgingly because
the jump in bank deposits was by then embarrassingly
visible. The open-market operations effectively vali-
dated the deposit expansion and left the Federal
Reserve with a difficult problem of gradually shrink-
ing deposits and the money supply in order to get
back on a normal growth course later.
More serious were the money market procedures
that were adopted in order to control the aggregates.
When finally explained in early 1971, they proved
to be an uneasy compromise between the old practice
of accommodating short-run changes in demands for
credit and the new objective. As explained by mem-
bers of the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the aggregative target turned out to be an
indirect one rather than a direct one. The Federal
Open Market Committee attempted to specify at
each meeting a set of money market conditions (in-
terest rates and level of member bank borrowings)
that staff estimates indicated would produce the de-
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sired expansion of the money supply. The money
market conditions were then the operating target for
day-to-day purchases and sales of securities.
If the FOMC was indeed ever serious in its pursuit
of aggregative goals the results were obviously not
always what the Committee intended. In the third
and fourth quarters of 1970, these procedures led
to a short-fall for many weeks between the 5 per
cent per year money supply target and actual mone-
tary growth. With short-term interest rates falling
rapidly in the fourth quarter of 1970, staff estimates
consistently over-estimated the rates of money supply
growth that would occur with the money-market con-
ditions that the Open Market Committee sought to
maintain. The money supply grew less than intended,
principally because the Committee at that time was
fearful that short-term rates would fall too far and
would increase the balance-of-payments deficit.
In the first five months of 1971, the problem was
just the opposite. When interest rates began to rise
because of the economic recovery, the Committee
hesitated about letting them rise. The effort to
moderate the rise of rates through the purchase of
government securities expanded bank reserves and
the money supply. Staff estimates of the money-supply
growth that would result from any given set of money-
market conditions were likely then to have been
consistently on the low side, Money supply must
have grown more than the Open Market Committee
intended because the Committee could hardly have
meant to exceed the monetary expansion of early
1967, which was generally considered in retrospect
to be a major mistake.
But flaws in techniques are only a minor reason
why central banks do not control the money supply.
The major explanation is that they don’t want to.
The reasons for central bank reluctance to control
the money supply are complex and difficult to under-
stand, involving as they do psychological and political,
as well as analytical, elements. Enhanced understand-
ing of why central banks behave the way they do
will require far more work of biography and institu-
tional analysis than has yet been done,
When it evolves, a good theory of central bank
behavior is likely to use the stature, role, and function
categories of sociological research. It is likely to con-
clude that institutions — including the job market —
tend to select as central bankers those with a talent for
a particular kind of role playing: the appearance —
and perhaps also the fact — of a taste for stability.
Those individuals who rise in central banks are peo-
ple who can impress other people that they can keep
their heads no matter what — and no matter whether
it is true or not.
Central bankers, moreover, will be shown as having
exceptionally catholic tastes in choosing targets for
stabilization. As historical actors, their ideal role is
that of defenders of society from any institution and
individual, or any set of ideas, that society perceives
as threatening to impair stability, whether the threat
is, in fact, credible ornot.
Since the chiefsphere of central bankers is obviously
the financial markets, their chief stabilization targets
are obviously financial variables. And since the most
immediately visible signs of financial change are
prices of financial assets, central bankers tend es-
pecially to be fascinated with controlling interest
rates and exchange rates to present an aura of
stability in financial markets.
It is, of course, a platitude to say that financial
stability is desirable. It is also true that the processes
that select stability maximizers as central bankers
are historically useful. The real question, of course,
is over the rules of central bank behavior that are
most likely to produce that stability.
One aspect of central bank taste for stability mani-
fests itself in a desire to stabilize everything at the
same time. A fascinating manifestation of this ten-
dency has been central bank reaction to the rise first
of Keynesian analysis and then of monetarist analysis.
Keynesian analysis of the policy transmission mech-
anism placed great stress on the role of investment
spending in influencing the level of economic activity.
Policy influenced investment via interest rates. Ac-
cordingly, the requirements of policy could be large
changes in interest rates — particularly in light of the
Keynesian view that private investment is inherently
unstable. Irrespective of the merits of the Keynesian
case, it obviously posed a major challenge to central
bankers, with whom interest rate changes are about
as popular as hoof and mouth disease. The reaction
in the United States was the development of the
credit availability doctrine. Economists of the U.S.
Federal Reserve System, led by Robert V. Roosa,
developed this new theory of monetary control soon
after World War 11.13
11jlobert V. Roosa, “Interest Rates and the Central Bank,” in
Money, Trade and Economic Growth, prepared in honor of
John II. Willianis (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 270-
295. See also Ira 0. Scott, Jr., “The Availability Doctrine:
Theoretical Underpinnings,” Review of Economic Studies,
October 1957, pp. 41-48.
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Belief in the efficacy of credit availability had two
main roots: a centuries-old concern of central banks
over the amounts and kinds of credit and the famous
surveys of the 1940s that showed that interest rates
had little effect on investment spending.
The credit-availability doctrine purported to tri-
umph over the apparent disability of interest rates by
maintaining that monetary policy works much more
through influencing the availability of credit than
through influencing the cost. Therefore, it held that
it is possible to curb spending through restricting the
availability of bank reserves without raising interest
rates very much (and vice versa). It was easy to see
why the new theory should be eagerly seized as the
rationale for Federal Reserve policy, for, as James
Tobin has said, “it offered the hope that monetary
policies can be effective without the large fluctua-
tions in interest rates which used to be considered
essential.”14
The Federal Reserve has yet to come up with a
formal theoretical umbrella for monetarism. But in
the specific rules for guiding behavior that emerged
after the adoption of an aggregative target in early
1970, the central bank desire to control everything
again manifests itself. We have already discussed
these procedures. We only note here that the motiva-
tion for adopting them is related to a desire to control
interest rates and money-market conditions as well as
the money supply itself. This is probably the reason
that the control procedures that emerged were in fact
a hybrid aimed, as Jerry L. Jordan and Neil A. Stevens
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis have pointed
out, at trying to control “money-market conditions
on a day-to-day basis with a view to controlling
money-market aggregates over the longer term.”15
According to this approach, the growth of the de-
mand deposit component of the money stock can be
influenced by interest rates as well as the so-called
transactions needs of the public, and money market
pressures can be controlled in such a way as to
achieve a desired growth of deposits. The difficul-
ties with the rules of behavior that spring from this
hybrid theory have already been described,
This brief discussion of the Federal Reserve re-
sponse to theoretical challenges hardly points to all
the morals in the story of Federal Reserve resistance
14
James Tobin, “A New Theory of Credit Control: The Avail-
ability Thesis,” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 35, No. 2, May 1953, pp. 118-27.
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Jerry L. Jordan and Neil A. Stevens, “The Year 1970— A
‘Modest’ Beginning for Moneta,y Aggregates,” Review, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May 1971, p. 18.
to controlling the money supply. But it does show a
strong Federal Reserve preference for controlling —
or seeming to control — many variables rather than
just one.
Even if the central bank chooses to control only one
variable, it is unlikely that the money supply would
be the optimal choice dictated by institutional con-
siderations. Controlling the money supply would mean
that the Federal Reserve would have to allow inter-
est rates or money-market conditions to vary (al-
though it is our belief that the amount of fluctuation
that would occur can easily be overestimated). And
this variation would occur in the precise areas where
the Fed most prefers stability. This preference stems
from a traditional central bank concern with the state
of markets — particularly the market for government
debt — and from a tendency to infer what would
make for stability in the economy from what is per-
ceived as making for stability at that point in the
economy that is the proximate matrix of Federal Re-
serve actions — again the market for government
debt.
It is finally worth noting that questions over the
motivation of the actions of a central bank are similar
to those in other parts of a government bureaucracy.
Adopting a money supply standard or any other
measurable standard for action is one that people
instinctively resist, preferring instead leeway for ad
hoc justifications of past behavior.
Ought Central Banks control the
money supply?
Because monetary policies affect the economy with
long time lags, the monetary authorities cannot im-
mediately see the effects of their actions on such key
variables as national income, employment, and prices.
Therefore, they must use intermediate guides for
their day-to-day operations to tell them if they are
exerting an influence in the right direction and in
appropriate amounts.
The current world debate over the proximate goals
for guiding monetary policy focuses on two main pos-
sible guides or groups of guides. On the one side are
interest rates, which are price measures. On the other
side are the monetary aggregates. We have already
seen that central banks strive for a compromise be-
tween the two, but both guides cannot be followed
at the same time. If a central bank attempts to con-
trol interest rates, it must allow money supply to
fluctuate. If it controls money supply, it must allow
interest rates to fluctuate.
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A good guide must have two characteristics. First,
it should be closely under the control of the central
bank so that the central bank can interpret a change
in the guide as the result of its own actions rather
than the result of outside forces. Second, changes in
the guide should have a strong and predictable rela-
tionship to changes in ultimate policy variables, such
as income, employment, and thç price level. The
grand theme of the monetarist challenge is that the
money supply fits these criteria better than any of the
available alternatives, We will not here attempt an
elaboration of this grand theme but only a minor
variation on it.
Insofar as a case for monetarism exists in the minds
of noneconomists, it is because of the pursuit of inter-
est rate targets by the Federal Reserve in the second
half of the 1960s. The record of the FOMC (always
properly interpreted) indicates that three major at-
tempts were made to keep or push interest rates
lower than they would otherwise have been in the
short run: in late 1965 and 1967 and again in 1968.
In each instance, the money supply spurted and in-
terest rates behaved in accordance with monetarist
predictions. Policy makers were each time eventually
confronted with a material escalation in the rate struc-
ture that could hardly have been said to be a goal of
policy. Each time, moreover, the economy also be-
haved in accordance with morietarist forecasts —
even though in 1968 fiscal policy was highly restric-
tive. The two episodes of restrictive monetary policy
in 1966 and 1969 also produced economic behavior
much in line with the expectations of monetarists.
The existence of some kind of a case for mone-
tarism in the mind of the public is perhaps not with-
out relevance to the evolution of central bank policy,
for it may in the end make a poor Boswell out of
Harry Johnson. In the Ely lecture at last December’s
meeting of the American Economic Association, John-
son argued that monetarism is on the way out be-
cause, as the economics of inflation, it would be
abandoned by governments who perceive that the
public prefers full employment to price stability.’6
We, by contrast, would prefer to view monetarism as
an analytical position. And in the realm of policy we
would be quite content (in the present state of knowl-
edge) modestly to define monetarist policy as one in
which the monetary authority pursues stable growth
of the monetary aggregates.
t0It is impossible within the space available to treat ade-
quately the reasoning by which Harry Johnson reaches
this conclusion. See Harry C. Johnson, “The Keynesian
Revolution and the Monetarist Counter-Revolution,” The
Richard T. Ely Lecture, The American Economic Review,
May 1971, pp. 1-14.
Based on what the Federal Reserve has done so
far in 1971, Professor Johnson does indeed look like a
good Boswell. But the market reaction to Federal
Reserve policy this year makes the fate of his predic-
tion less certain. Interest rates have risen on signals
that the rate of growth of the money supply was
increasing. It is difficult for the Federal Reserve to
overlook this reaction. And if market participants be-
come convinced monetarists (as they might, given
sufficient conditioning), the rise in long rates would
be just sufficient to build the appropriate Fisher pre-
mium into long-term interest rates.
Insofar as the level of interest rates influences
spending decisions, it is expectations of the real rate
that count, This is a point on which good mone-
tarists and good Keynesians both agree. Accordingly,
the ascription of potency to movements in the nomi-
nal rate depends on the public being fooled in the
short run, But if the public becomes monetarist-
minded this won’t happen. Accordingly, any possible
domestic argument for central bank pursuit of inter-
est rate targets would fall to the ground. Johnson
may well be right about the preferences of policy-
niakers. But if we are right about the behavior of
markets, his conclusion could nevertheless turn out to
be incorrect, for it could turn central bankers into
pursuers of aggregative targets.
This argument also applies to the character of the
short-run tradeoff between the rate of employment
and the rate of inflation. Insofar as more inflation
buys less unemployment, it is because participants in
labor markets are fooled into perceiving changes in
the nominal values of wages as changes in real values.
But again, public perception of the impact of rapid
monetary acceleration would greatly reduce the
short-run employment bang that the Federal Reserve
buys for a buck.
Public perception, public policy, and economic
analysis do interact. This minor theme reinforces the
major theme of monetarist analysis that central banks
ought to pursue the goal of stable monetary growth.
Indeed, the minor theme represents one possible
basis — there are others — for believing that Harry
Johnson could have been wrong about the ultimate
fate of monetarism.
Ought the world money supply
he controlled?
When a definitive history of monetarism comes to
be written, it will probably characterize the intellec-
tual process by which the monetarist position on in-
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ternational monetary affairs came to be almost solely
identified with flexible exchange rates as unfortunate.
Flexible rates are obviously a key to a rational system
of international monetary coordination. But even
more so is the monetarist emphasis on stable mone-
tary growth rates. Moreover, the kind of monetarist
analysis that has made headway in the United States
through pointing out the irrationality of the conven-
tional targets of macroeconomic policy has an equal
bearing on the conventional wisdom about the proper
scope and content of rules for the international coor-
dination of economic policy. It is unfortunate that this
emphasis is only now coming to the attention of pol-
icy makers and the public.
It is a dogma among economists that most of the
world’s ills spring from the malfeasance, misfeasance,
or nonfeasance of politicians. But comfortable as this
view may be, it can be argued equally cogently that
much of the trouble with the world monetary system
today springs directly from the tendency of politi-
cians to do what economists tell them to do.
If world monetary equilibrium can be roughly de-
fined as reasonably stable exchange rates, reasonably
full employment, and reasonable stability of world
prices, it would describe a state that clearly does not
exist in 1971. Everywhere prices are rising. Some ex-
change rates have been jumping, while others have
been held at parity only by large central bank opera-
tions in foreign exchange markets. Therefore, coun-
tries have neither stable prices nor stable exchange
rates. And economists have to bear a good share of
the responsibility for this state of affairs.
Any short statement about the sources of the cur-
rent malaise is an oversimplification. But it is perhaps
not totally unrealistic to attribute most of the dis-
turbance to the excessive money-supply growth in the
United States between 1964 and 1968. Although the
United States was by no means responsible for all of
the world’s price inflation, there is no question that
the burst of U.S. money supply growth between 1964
and 1968 accelerated it. Nor are the hands of econ-
omists entirely clean in any analysis of why this
occurred, It is true that the weight of U.S. economic
opinion did favor a tax surcharge to pay for the Viet-
nam war — and favored it before it was recommended
by the Administration and long before it was enacted
into law. But many economists argued for low inter-
est rates in late 1965. The weight of economic opinion
favored the rapid reversal of monetary policy in the
1967 minirecession. Furthermore, the pessimistic
forecast that led to a burst of money-supply growth
in 1968, when the tax surcharge was enacted in the
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United States, was widely shared in the economics
profession.
It is also true that insofar as the Federal Reserve
has again turned to rapid monetary expansion in 1971,
its actions are supported by the analysis of those econ-
omists who persist in ignoring the direct effect of
money supply growth on income and prices and who
continue to identify a stimulative monetary policy
with the deliberate pursuit by the central banks of
low nominal interest rates.
Clearly then, one requirement for movement
toward a better world money system is better eco-
nomic analysis. And, as in the case of domestic pol-
icy, monetarism clearly has an important role to play.
Again, a full adumbration of the monetarist view of
world money is beyond the scope of this paper. In-
stead we will content ourselves with the statement of
a number of maxims. The first series will be prohibi-
tions, a series of statements of what not to do if world
monetary coordination is to be achieved, We will then
state two positive rules that we believe would pro-
mote world monetary equilibrium.
The most important of the negative rules is one for
the U.S. Federal Reserve: If the Federal Reserve is
to contribute to world monetary equilibrium, it will
have to give up its attempts at contracyclical policies
at home or in the world as a whole, As our discussion
of Federal Reserve actions has already indicated,
much of the monetary acceleration of the years from
1964 to 1968 was the result of attempted contracyci-
cal actions. Coping with bad forecasts and with the
lags between policy actions and their effects in the
U.S. economy is difficult enough. When the additional
transmission lags of international payments are con-
sidered, it should be obvious that managing world
contracyclical policies from Washington and New
York exceeds the capacities of the Fed — or of any
other agencies for that matter. The Federal Reserve
cannot be the world’s central bank, nor is one needed.
Given the tendency of economists to tinker and
prescribe, this is a difficult anti-maxim to follow. When
money supply growth in the United States acceler-
ates, the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit increases
and the world money supply grows more rapidly.
This has suggested to some economists, including
Robert Mundell of the University of Chicago and
Richard Cooper of Yale, that the Federal Reserve
System should try to stabilize the world economy by
supplying more money at some times than at others.
Mundell, for example, said in 1968 that the Federal
Reserve has completed a full cycle of tight money
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and easy money during 1966-67 that was consistent
with the requirements of the world economy.17 That
was far too generous an appraisal, for the volatile
U.S. monetary policies of those years had markedly
increased economic instability and price inflation not
only in the United States but in the rest of the world.
The idea of steady growth in the U.S. money sup-
ply should appeal to the reluctant partners of the
United States in the international monetary system,
although it runs counter to a deepseated central
banker aversion to being constrained by rules. Gyra-
tions in U.S. policies, which other countries have seen
as balance-of-payments problems, have been deeply
unsetthng to them in recent years, and with good
reason. If they must live with the dollar — and there
does not appear to be a ready alternative if they
want fixed rates, too, — other countries should prefer
a predictable, stable dollar to one that incessantly
bounces to the latest beat in the U.S. economy.
A corollary of this rule, of course, is that other
countries too should avoid contracyclical policies. It
is worth noting that the conventional analysis which
ascribed the most recent monetary crisis to a differ-
ence in cycle phases between countries was correct.
But most commentaries failed to point out that the
cycles at issue can hardly be described as resulting
from the inherent instability of any private economy.
Instead, they were cycles caused by the character of
contracyeical policies in the United States. Essen-
tially, they were reverberations of the initial distur-
bance caused by the hyper-expansive U.S. policies of
1964-68. Nothing could do more to mitigate business
cycles than the abandonment of contracycical mone-
tary policies around the world.
All attempts at international interest-rate coordina-
tion should be abandoned, as should the attempts to
affect the term structure of rates. Those officials and
economists who have called on the United States to
raise interest rates to affect the flow of funds across
the exchanges have asked U.S. authorities to do the
impossible. Are higher interest rates to be achieved
by a deceleration of monetary growth? If so, the
policy would be self-defeating in the long run, which
might not be a very long run either, given the tend-
ency of U.S. capital markets to behave increasingly
as monetarists say they should. Or are higher rates to
be achieved by an acceleration of monetary growth?
This policy might achieve the expected results; but
surely it is not what Europeans, who would have to
t7
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cope with another wave of dollars, have in mind. A
desire to manipulate interest rates is deepseated
among those who worry about balance-of-payments
equilibrium. Its antecedents reach all the way back
to the early Mercantilists. But it is to be doubted that
interest-rate manipulation can make even shortrun
contributions to stability, particularly given the en-
hanced tendency of markets to act on monetarist
expectations.
The so-called international liquidity problem should
be recognized for what it is — essentially a side issue.
Much attention has been focused on the seeming
paradox of worldwide concern about a shortage of
international liquidity at the same time a worldwide
price inflation indicates that the world is actually
swamped in money. It is understandable that central
bankers worry that there may not be enough of the
kinds of money that they prefer for their own use.
Dollars have become less attractive to some central
banks, as shrinking U.S. gold holdings make it ob-
vious that the United States cannot convert all central-
bank dollars to gold.
Central bankers also do face a dilemma of what to
use for reserves if the United States were ever to
succeed in eliminating its balance-of-payments deficit.
But the provision of a reserve asset is not the most
important problem in the evolution of the interna-
tional monetary system. Fears that domestic deflation
might result from a deficiency in international re-
serves seem greatly exaggerated. A shortage of inter-
national reserves may make it difficult to avoid
changes in exchange rates, but it would not force
domestic deflation on a country that did not want to
deflate. Central bankers are surely ingenious enough
to find domestic assets they could monetize in a pinch,
whatever the state of their international reserves. If
anything, they are likely to err on the side of doing
too much rather than too little.
Nor, in view of the pressure to exchange real goods
and services, is there a serious danger that the growth
of international trade and investment will be strangled
by a deficiency in the supply of official reserves. The
traders of the world will find the monetary instru-
ments necessary to do their work, unless, of course,
governments block their way with controls, Right
now, dollars serve the needs of trade very well. To
rephrase an old slogan: money follows trade; trade
doesn’t follow money.
Controls are not the way to deal with the so-called
Eurodollar problem. The Eurodollar market at its
present size is a function of controls, including U.S.
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balance-of-payments policies, such as the interest
equalization tax and the “voluntary” restraint on bank
loans to foreigners and the mandatory restraints on
direct foreign investment. All of these controls could
and should be abandoned. If they were, and if the
regulation of bank lime-deposit rates in the United
States were abolished, the Eurodollar market would
wither to a shadow of its former sell. It would not be
a great offshore, out-of-control creator of dollars. Re-
moval of controls — not another layer of controls — is
the way to deal with the Eurodollar problem.
If these particular anti-maxims add up to one grand
anti-maxim, it is this: the goal of world monetary
equilibrium should not be pursued directly. In the
Aristotelian view, he who pursues happiness directly
will find it elusive. Happiness, instead, is an unsought
reward for doing other things well. So it is with eco-
nomic policy.
The positive monetarist maxim for international
equilibrium is for central banks of the world to con-
centrate on doing what they can do — controlling
money supply — and to abandon attempts to do what
they cannot do — controlling interest rates and bal-
ance-of-payments deficits or surpluses. By following
a steady-growth policy, furthermore, they would have
the best chance of enjoying both price stability and
stable exchange rates.
If the world stays with the fixed-exchange-rate
system, with the dollar as the key reserve currency,
the system would resemble the gold standard but
with steady gold (dollar) production. The world
money supply would be determined primarily by the
United States. The steady rate of dollar production,
however, would enormously simplify the world’s
monetary problems.
The rate of dollar inflow is a determinant of money-
supply growth in surplus countries; but, as we have
seen, it is not — and certainly need not be — the sole
determinant. Central bank purchases of domestic as-
sets (or loans through their discount windows) usually
are even more important than their purchases of for-
eign exchange as sources of highpowered money. This
is obviously true also of the deficit countries because
they have no net dollar inflows to force money-supply
expansion. Controlling their purchases or sales of do-
mestic assets, therefore, will permit central banks to
control domestic money supply in a fixed-exchange-
rate system, if exchange parities are reasonably close
to equilibrium levels and if no ma/or country upsets
the system by expanding its money supply too fast.
To initiate such a system, however, may require
adjustments to today’s parities.
If a particular country lets its money supply grow
slightly too fast (in relation to the rate of growth of
the supply of dollars), it will lose dollars from its
reserves. This suggests a way by which central banks
can get rid of the dollars they accumulated in pegging
rates after the U.S. inflation began in 1965. If a coun-
try lets its money supply grow at less than the equili-
brium rate (with relation to the dollar), it will gain
reserves. In either case, little harm would be done
either to exchange-rate stability or to price stability
if the money-supply growth rates are stable.
One of the principal advantages of the steady-
growth rule from the standpoint of the international
monetary system is that it would greatly reduce pres-
sures to change exchange rates. The question of
whether to have fixed rates or free rates, therefore,
would become less important because exchange-rate
stability could be maintained under either system.
Volatility of national monetary policies has over-
whelmed attempts to achieve exchange-rate stability
under the fixed-exchange-rate system in the past.
Exchange rates would be more stable if they were
allowed to float in a world in which individual na-
tions followed steady-growth monetary policies than
they would be with a system of adjustable pegs. This
is because there would not be the incentive for de-
stabilizing speculation that the one-way options of
the peg system provide now, The small residual ad-
justments in exchange rates that might be necessary
if central banks follow a steady-money-growth rule
should occur slowly and gradually enough that busi-
nessmen could allow for them as they now allow for
changes in the purchasing power of domestic
currencies.
Another advantage of the steady-growth rule (es-
pecially with floating rates) is that elaborate arrange-
inents for international coordination of policies would
not be required. If agreement on policies is sought,
it is far easier to agree on something simple that can
be carried out entirely at home by each country.
By floating their exchange rates, furthermore, those
countries that agreed to follow steady, noninflationary
monetary policies would be protected from disrup-
tions caused by countries that were not willing to go
along. The world would then have sound money and
stable exchange rates within the group of steady-
growth countries and unstable rates between these
countries and the outsiders. The advantages of free
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trade and investment should provide incentive for
more countries to join.
In such a world; the countries that did not bring
money under control would soon learn the lesson
pointed to by Sir Dennis Robertson in 1948:
Now if a country is rapidly increasing its supply of
money, the same lack of confidence in the future
of the money which ultimately wonns its way into
the skull of the thickest-headed citizen, strikes like a
flash upon the consciousness of the well-informed
and impressionable gentlemen whose business it is
to carry on dealings in foreign money. They become
highly willing to buy foreign money and to sell the
money of their own country.’8
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